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abstract: Although the work of Jürgen Habermas is often associated with consti-
tutional patriotism as a post-national and post-conventional political identification 
and allegiance to a set of fundamental norms and principles of a political community, 
Habermas himself did not elaborate it as a fully-fledged theory. Nevertheless, this 
paper shows that constitutional patriotism is rooted in some of the most significant 
elements of his epistemology and is integrally embedded in his social and political 
theory. The idea of the paper is to offer, through the lens of Habermas’s philosophy, 
a compelling logical and normative argumentation in favor of constitutional patrio-
tism as a desirable and coherent conception of social and political integration in 
plural democratic societies. The paper examines the relevance of Habermas’s theory 
of post-metaphysical reason, discourse ethics, and dichotomies stemming from the 
tension between liberal and republican paradigms for the notion of constitutional 
patriotism. At the same time, it explains how these theoretical fragments endow 
constitutional patriotism with normative validity and legitimacy in instances of 
its practical application in contemporary complex societies. The idea of the paper 
is to show the normative advantages of this concept and reaffirm its salience for 
contemporary theoretical debates on citizenship, social integration, and democracy.
keywords: Habermas, constitutional patriotism, cooriginality thesis, law, democ-
racy, human rights.
Introduction
In his essay “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure” (1988), Habermas quotes 
German historian Rudolf von Thadden, saying at the German-French 
meeting in Belfort that with high immigration percentage, “nations run 
the risk of changing their identity,” and that “soon they will no longer 
be able to understand themselves as monocultural societies, if they do 
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not provide any points of integration beyond pure ethnic descent.” “In 
these circumstances,” the quote continues, it “becomes urgent that we 
return to the idea of the citizen as the citoyen, which is at once more open 
and less rigid than the traditional idea of ethnic belonging” (Habermas 
1997: 38). With the first wave of immigration to Western democracies, 
the need to integrate plural societies became the pivotal question of 
contemporary political philosophy. Habermas’s answer to this question 
was constitutional patriotism. 
Constitutional patriotism is often associated with Habermas’s po-
litical philosophy and only recently with his intellectual debates on the 
future of the European Union.1 It is clear that Habermas’s idea of con-
stitutional patriotism resonates with the change depicted in the above-
mentioned quote, which relates to a new, contemporary understanding 
of citizenship as a fundamental notion of political life in plural societies. 
Constitutional patriotism reflects this change: in a new socio-historical 
context, active or participatory and passive or rights-based (constitu-
tional) – as well as identitary or patriotic – components of citizenship 
seek new interpretations. Nevertheless, since Habermas did not offer 
a fully developed and well-argued theory of constitutional patriotism, 
what kind of normative argumentation it rests on remains unclear, just 
as it remains unclear to what extent this notion fits into his general 
theoretical framework.
The situation is somewhat different with the constitutional patriotism that first 
arose after culture and politics had been differentiated from one another more 
strongly than they were in the nation states of the old stamp. In this process, 
identification with one’s own form of life and tradition was overlaid with an 
abstract patriotism that no longer referred to the concrete whole of a nation but 
to abstract procedures and principles. What the latter have in view are the condi-
tions of common life and communication among different, coexisting forms of 
life with equal rights – externally as well as internally. (Habermas 1988: 9-10)
1 The notion of constitutional patriotism re-emerged in the context of historians’ dispute 
(Historikerstreit) during the mid-1980s between conservative and leftist intellectuals over the 
evaluation of Nazi crimes and critical memory in general. Since the shared history was full of 
crimes committed in the name of ethnicity, the past, the nation, or the state itself could not be 
a legitimate reason for the national unity. There was a need for a different focus on common, 
democratic identity and patriotic allegiance, which was supposed to be found in universal norms 
of a polity, its legal order, rather than in ethnicity, Nazion, or other historic, pre-political ideals. 
Dolf Sternberger elaborated his idea of constitutional patriotism in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
of 23 May 1979, on the 30th anniversary of German basic law (Grundgesetz). The normative 
distinction between Strernberger and Habermas is clear: “where Sternberger’s patriotism had 
centered on democratic institutions worth defending, Habermas focused on the public sphere as 
providing a space for public reasoning among citizens” (Müller 2006: 278-296).
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Habermas situates constitutional patriotism within a dichotomy of 
political culture and culture en generale. “A liberal political culture is 
only the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism (Verfas-
sungspatriotismus) that heightens an awareness of both the diversity and 
the integrity of the different forms of life coexisting in a multicultural 
society” (Habermas 1996: 500). Whereas “culture” is related to thick 
ethical, aesthetic, and axiological values in general, “political culture” 
results from the exchange and communication between perspectives 
of different traditions. “The universalism of legal principles is reflected 
in a procedural consensus, which must be embedded in the context of 
a historically specific political culture through a kind of constitutional 
patriotism” (Habermas 1994a: 135).
A broad body of literature emerged as a reaction to the idea of 
constitutional patriotism – both critique and support of its added value 
for contemporary political thought.2 “Habermas’s call for constitutional 
patriotism – like most appeals to cosmopolitanism – tries to establish a 
political community on the basis of thin identities and normative uni-
versalism” (Calhoun 2002: 157). “One of the key concepts that informs 
Habermas’s response to questions of cultural diversity is his notion of 
‘constitutional patriotism’” (Baumeister 2007: 483). One might deduce 
from these statements that the implications of constitutional patriotism 
for Habermas’s political theory go way beyond his explicit theoretical 
argumentation on that issue. This paper aims to shed light on specific 
parts of Habermas’s comprehensive and ambitious political theory, rel-
evant for the issue of plural societies and understanding of constitutional 
patriotism, to show that this concept implicitly, but coherently, echoes 
within the overall system of ideas that Habermas’s epistemology and so-
cial philosophy offer. For methodological reasons, “constitutional patrio-
tism” is used to denote post-national and post-conventional universalist 
political identification and allegiance to the set of normative components 
of a constitution, broadly understood as the political and legal order of 
a particular polity (Markell 2000: 40; Michelman 2001: 269). 
The paper has four sections. Habermas’s theory of post-metaphysical 
reason (section 1) grounds his social and political philosophy in the realm 
of intersubjective recognition and discourse ethics. Facticity and valid-
ity of law (section 2), Habermas’s contribution to legal theory, reflect 
important dimensions of the dichotomy between public sovereignty and 
2 E.g., Ingram 1996; Canovan 2000; Markell 2000; Fossum 2001; Laborde 2002; Hayward 
2007; Müller 2007; Schwartz 2011.
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human rights, a leitmotif of modern and contemporary political thought. 
This theoretical dilemma of causal and normative primacy between 
republican (sovereignty) and liberal (rights) paradigms, which Haber-
mas tried to overcome in his cooriginality thesis (section 3), has salient 
implications for his conception of legitimacy (section 4). By elaborating 
the theoretical fragments in Habermas’s social and political philosophy, 
I will point to their possible theoretical and normative relation to and 
relevance for the notion of constitutional patriotism.
1. A post-metaphysical theory of reason and 
discourse ethics
To put forward some of his social theory arguments and embed them 
within a broader philosophical and historical tradition, Habermas de-
velops a “post-metaphysical” theory of reason. He introduces the idea of 
communicative reason through which he overcomes the shortcomings of 
both metaphysically rooted substantive, foundational reason, which has 
been consistently called into question by 20th-century philosophy, and 
postmodern relativization of reason as such, problematized by the argu-
ment of performative contradiction.3 This theory aims to reconstruct the 
practical and normative conditions for legal and political intersubjective 
communication. In principle, its main idea is to overcome the epistemo-
logical and theoretical abyss between individual and social dichotomies 
that stem from it: morality and ethics, validity and facticity of the law, 
private and public autonomy. The change identified in post-metaphysical 
reason consequentially reflects the idea of social and political, which, in 
Habermas’s interpretation, attains new normative meaning4 based firmly 
on the notion of intersubjectivity. This epistemological turn has direct 
implications for his ethics.
Habermas’s concept of reason reflects the overall linguistic turn 
as one of the main streams of Western philosophy in the 20th century.5 
According to Rehg (1996: xiii), “for Habermas a post-metaphysical vin-
dication of reason is possible only insofar as philosophy […] can show 
how the use of language and social interaction in general necessarily rely 
on notions of validity, such as truth, normative rightness, sincerity, and 
3 Cf. Habermas 1990a; Habermas 1992; Matustik 1989.
4 Cf. Habermas 1992.
5 “These themes – postmetaphysical thinking, the linguistic turn, situating reason, and 
overcoming logocentrism – are among the most important motive forces of philosophizing in 
the twentieth century, in spite of the boundaries between schools” (Habermas 1992: 8).
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authenticity.” The notions of legitimacy and validity are thus linguisti-
cally construed, which implies that the circumstances of speech acts 
in the public sphere are crucial for determining these notions’ overall 
value/impact. The change in the concept of reasoning had to find its 
corresponding change in the overall political and ethical – in a word, 
normative – self-understanding of modern subjects.6 The difference 
between “moral” and “ethical” in Habermas’s view moderately reminds 
one of the Kantian position on the same matter.
The distinction between autonomous and heteronomous actions has in fact 
revolutionized our normative consciousness. At the same time, there has been 
a growing need for justification, which, under the conditions of postmetaphysi-
cal thinking, can be met only by moral discourses. The latter aim at the impartial 
evaluation of action conflicts. In contrast to ethical deliberations, which are 
oriented to the telos of my/our own good (or not misspent) life, moral delibera-
tions require a perspective freed of all egocentrism or ethnocentrism. Under the 
moral viewpoint of equal respect for each person and equal consideration for the 
interests of all, the henceforth sharply focused normative claims of legitimately 
regulated interpersonal relationships are sucked into a whirlpool of problema-
tization. (Habermas 1994b: 4-5)
In Habermas, unlike in Kant’s theory, both morality and rationality lie 
in private individual ethical and practical reasoning and result from in-
terpersonal interactions. Since the discursive democracy and discursive 
ethics are focused on the communication process itself rather than its 
presumed aim, it is necessary to determine conditions that need to be 
satisfied by a form of communication free from distortions that impede 
the argumentative search for truth or rightness. Habermas formulates 
these conditions through three principles: universalization, participation, 
and free acceptance (Habermas 1990b: 65-66, 93). Already at this point, 
one might identify principles that constitute a core normative essence 
of constitutional patriotism. As the bases of constitutional patriotism 
as a concept, constitutions are necessarily acts of universalizing will that 
results from equal and free participation of those who consent on (ac-
cept) constitutional principles and rules. Like modern constitutionalism, 
Habermas’s discourse ethics has its roots in the Enlightenment projects 
of democracy and continuous political emancipation.
6 “The postmetaphysical legitimation of positive law must instead draw on peculiarly mod-
ern ideas – such as autonomy and self-realization which grew out of the very same process that 
destroyed the pool of premodern legitimations” (Habermas 1994b: 2) The issue of conceptual and 
empirical primacy between the two, one that stems from the liberal (autonomy) paradigm and 
the other from the republican (self-realization) paradigm, is resolved in Habermas’s cooriginality 
thesis, which I address in section 3.
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There are rules that should enable an ideal speech situation, the con-
text in which discourse principles may be fulfilled. In “Discourse Ethics”, 
these rules are listed as follows: 1) every subject with the competence 
to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; 2a) everyone is 
allowed to question any assertion whatever; 2b) everyone is allowed to 
introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse; 2c) everyone is al-
lowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs; 3) no speaker may be 
prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as 
laid down in 1) and 2) (Habermas 1990b: 86). This aspect of discourse 
ethics has clear implications for constitutional patriotism. Despite the 
pluralism of different comprehensive doctrines and worldviews in mod-
ern society, individuals and groups can still come up with a broad set of 
social values that result from intersubjective interaction.7 The relevance 
of the results of such deliberation depends, as explained, on conditions in 
which debate takes place. For a constitution to be an object of allegiance 
and to enjoy full legitimacy, the context in which it is deliberated must 
be in accordance with the rules of dialogical requirements of discourse 
principle. Constitutional patriotism has motivational and normative 
strength only when constitutions result from such discourses. Not only 
is the ideal position of equality – which Habermas’s discourse ethics 
implies – achieved by constitutional universalism based on equality of 
citizens regardless of their cultural and other particularities, but the 
constitution itself is an expression of communicative intersubjectivity 
that emerges in the practice of political life. 
In relation to other pre-political values, in which reasons, principles, 
and values can be drawn from particular and hermetic worldviews, con-
stitutional patriotism imposes the need to anchor them in the already 
accepted normative fields of consensus. The theory of communicative 
action, discourse theory, and the post-metaphysical reason on which they 
are based is the theoretical foundation for Habermas’s dealing with the 
problem of ethical pluralism, conflicting comprehensive doctrines, and 
7 Referring to other authors who contest comprehensive doctrines as a source of ethical 
reasoning in contemporary societies, Habermas points to John Rawls’s “political not metaphysi-
cal” theory of justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of “law as integrity”. Elaborating these two 
complex theoretical frameworks goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, one feature 
they have in common with Habermas’s theory is evident. Namely, both Rawls’s transition from 
justice as fairness towards political justice and Dworkin’s law as integrity (which presumes that 
rights should be understood as constructively interpreted by judges and stemming from the 
community’s conception of justice and fairness) imagine a sort of shared, procedurally obtained 
consensus over a coherent set of principles (cf. Dworkin 1986; Rawls 1993).
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justice8 in contemporary plural societies. “The transitory unity that is 
generated in the porous and refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically 
mediated consensus,” Habermas explains, “not only supports but furthers 
and accelerates the pluralization of forms of life and the individualization 
of lifestyles. More discourse means more contradiction and difference. 
The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse the disagree-
ments with which we can nonviolently live” (Habermas 1992: 129). In 
other words, the post-metaphysical intersubjective reason is not just a 
normative assumption but also a facticity that enhances the proliferation 
of social plurality. In this way, Habermas provided the epistemological 
and ethical basis for his conception of deliberative democracy, indirectly 
creating convincing normative arguments for a concept of constitutional 
patriotism. At the same time, this basis – the empirical intersubjectivity it 
entails – provides constitutional patriotism with a contextual dimension 
and idiosyncrasy, freeing it from abstract, elusive universalism.
2. Dichotomies of Habermas’s conception of law
For Habermas, law signifies an overarching communication matrix that 
enables the exchange between system and lifeworld, between the network 
of our determined and expected relations and background contexts and 
discourses, between the public domain and private dispositions. As he 
clarifies, “the language of law, unlike the moral communication restricted 
to the lifeworld, can function as a transformer in the society-wide com-
munication circulating between system and lifeworld” (Habermas 1996: 
81).9 The language of law that Habermas describes has specific rules and 
grammar, different from the rules and grammar of moral communica-
tion. In other words, law emerges in a particular discourse context and 
is led by its own prevailing reasons. However, the legal system and law 
itself should not be understood merely in a functional way. In a complex 
8 The post-metaphysical and intersubjective nature of reason will have normative implica-
tions for other aspects of Habermas’s political philosophy. Referring to Habermas’s concept of 
a proceduralist conception of justice, Rosenfeld (1996: 811) claims that “all perspectives that 
could be broadly characterized as metaphysical perspectives – including those framed by religious 
dogma and ideology – would effectively be excluded or, more precisely, would effectively exclude 
themselves from any dialogical process designed to resolve issues of justice.”
9 The system and the lifeworld follow normatively and functionally different patterns of 
rationality. “The system (bureaucracy and capitalism) is basically founded on instrumental ratio-
nality, which highlights efficiency and results, whereas the lifeworld is the site of communicative 
rationality, which highlights the interpersonally based requirement to provide compelling reasons 
for one’s actions” (Fossum 2001: 190).
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societal system, diversified social subjects and entities communicate via 
law. The integration of the society occurs in the process of mutual inter-
personal and intergroup recognition of validity claims (i.e., arguments in 
favor of imposed obligations and rights). Acceptability of validity claims 
gives additional legitimation to facticity, to the law as a given, imposed 
medium of intersubjective communication:
But law must do more than simply meet the functional requirements of a complex 
society; it must also satisfy the precarious conditions of a social integration that 
ultimately takes place through the achievements of mutual understanding on 
the part of communicatively acting subjects, that is, through the acceptability 
of validity claims (Habermas 1996: 83).
In this interpretation, the system of law encompasses two inter-
twined and interconnected but principally different phenomena: the 
positivity of law (sociological facticity) and the legitimacy claimed by it 
(normative validity). This Janus-faced nature of contemporary law can 
be conceptualized in two ways: as facticity or identified societal network 
of imposed laws, and as validity or internal legitimation of the laws 
by the citizens of a polity (cf. Habermas 1996).10 Ideally, as a concept 
primarily concerned with public autonomy and external acceptance of 
the rules (particularly in theories of procedural democracy), democracy 
as a system of self-imposed rules should correspond to our internal 
justification of these rules – our private autonomy (substantive notions 
of democracy).11 It is essential to notice that Habermas also deploys a 
dichotomy between “private” and “public” autonomy. In his understand-
ing, the constitution can be seen as “an interpretation and elaboration of 
a system of rights in which private and public autonomy are internally 
related” (Habermas 1996: 280). These spheres of individual autonomy are 
endowed with corresponding rights (i.e., negative and positive freedom). 
Private autonomy is a precondition for the free political participation 
of the citizens, while public autonomy is an expression of political will 
and a safeguard of private autonomy. Essentially, Habermas’s ambition 
is to reconcile liberal and republican standpoints regarding the primacy 
10 Habermas’s reconstruction of the social contract, as well as his vision of deliberative 
democracy, is deeply rooted in this dichotomy, as I elaborate in section 2. 
11 These two dimensions of public and private autonomy represent the liberty of an indi-
vidual to act and create: one is confined to his private domain and the other to the principles 
of common intersubjective political life. However, they relate to common norms of a political 
community (constitutional, legal order) in different ways. Just like negative and positive freedom, 
one is based on the limitation of intrusion of the others (protecting the liberty of private life), 
while the other is a matter of publicly achieved endeavors (active participation in political life).
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between concepts of sovereignty and human rights, which I will elaborate 
on below, in section 3. The dialectics of internal and external legitima-
tion of laws functions – and our public and private autonomy remains in 
equilibrium – only in the case of correspondence of the two faces of law.
The tension between facticity and validity within democratic polity 
can be resolved only if the laws can be fully legitimized by those on whom 
they are imposed, which, in other words, requires that subjects of law 
can identify themselves, at any point, as creators of the law. This ideal of 
deliberative democracy has a powerful normative impact on the theory of 
constitutional patriotism. The political and social substance that appeals 
to our respect and allegiance as citizens is found only in the basic set of 
principles and rules, because these are supposed to be unquestionably 
legitimized and, as such, crucial for the overall functioning of the polity. 
Feeling attachment and showing patriotic allegiance to any other sort of 
political phenomenon (practice or narrative) would not be normatively 
desirable because it does not provide common internal acceptance by 
all members of a (plural) polity.12
As a form of patriotic loyalty and citizenship allegiance, constitu-
tional patriotism also entails that the only acceptable and normatively 
relevant domain of political unity can be found within basic and con-
sensually determined constitutional norms and principles. As citizens 
of a polity, we are unified by principles that determine our common 
life and inter-subjective relations and that impose limits on our liberty, 
which we legitimize for the sake of peaceful coexistence in an ordered 
society, requesting the protection of our rights in return. No symbolic or 
normative concept should be an object of our patriotic loyalty unless it 
corresponds to these legitimately determined basic principles and rules.13 
These principles and rules should allow us to live freely and pursue our 
life goals without the domination of the state or any other party.
Constitutional patriotism, thus, unites our private autonomy as 
holders of rights and obligations and our public autonomy as creators 
of binding legal norms. The consensus in a constitutional democracy, 
12 If only norms that enjoy internal validity of a polity’s subjects can be imposed via con-
stitutional and legal acts, then majoritarian cultural (national, religious) norms that promote 
particular ethics do not satisfy this criterion.
13 Continuous contestation of these rules would be one of the clear signs of the illegitimate 
nature of these rules. Nevertheless, following the argumentation of constitutional patriotism, 
contestation has to be sound and reasonable and in harmony with minimal rules of the rule 
of law and democracy. Ergo, radicalism, terrorism, and fundamentalism cannot be considered 
reasonable contestations of the order. 
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embodied in the constitution, is at the same time a sociological fact 
and a source of validity of the entire political and legal life. In the ka-
leidoscope of public and private autonomy, facticity, and validity of law, 
constitutional patriotism is an ideal that should reconcile our divided 
legal and political identity, but also the Janus-faced nature of modern law. 
As both subject (creator) and object of law, the citizen is more certain 
to achieve the unity of her two identities (including her contradictory 
relation towards a legal norm) through constitutional norms, which have 
a higher degree of generality and validity and are not subject to continu-
ous contestation and deliberation. The more that basic constitutional 
(legal and political) norms result from intersubjective recognition and 
deliberation of individuals and groups, the lesser the facticity-validity 
gap in citizens’ attitudes toward them will be. The validity of law – as 
legitimacy claimed by law – is one of the strongest normative arguments 
in favor of constitutional patriotism over competing theories and strate-
gies of social integration, and it will be separately elaborated in section 
4 of this paper. This is how Habermas’s “facticity vs. validity” opposition 
becomes relevant for constitutional patriotism, which, as a theoretical 
concept, entails both sides of the above-explained binary oppositions. In 
the following section, I will address one of the basic ideas of Habermas’s 
political philosophy, closely entwined with the theories and arguments 
elaborated so far: the “cooriginality” thesis.
3. Cooriginality thesis
As Habermas explains, the universalist core of the constitutional state, 
as a result of the American and French revolutions, is contained in two 
paradigms of Western political philosophy: democracy and human rights. 
“This universalism still has its explosive power and vitality, not only in 
Third World countries and the Soviet bloc but also in European nations, 
where constitutional patriotism acquires new significance in the course of 
an identity transformation” (Habermas 1997: 37). The tension between 
these notions lies at the heart of modern and contemporary debates in 
political theory and the relations between democratic and liberal princi-
ples in the constitution of modern nation-states. Moreover, the notions 
of democracy and human rights – their epistemological elaboration and 
underpinning normative arguments – are essential for understanding 
Habermas’s political philosophy and the history of political thought.
Habermas uses the concept of cooriginality to resolve some of the 
fundamental dichotomies of modern political theory, such as republi-
P. ZENOVIĆ: Constitutional patriotism 129
canism vs. liberalism, security vs. liberty, public vs. private autonomy, 
democracy vs. human rights, positive vs. natural law, and coercion vs. 
legitimacy.14 That is to say, even though all these binary oppositions entail 
conflicting notions and project rather different values and normative con-
ceptions, in Habermas’s view, they are closely tied to the same conceptual 
and hypothetical moment: the emergence of the modern state. At the 
same time, great traditions of liberalism and republicanism cross their 
spears in the primacy dilemma between human rights and sovereignty. 
As Habermas notes, “liberal” traditions conceive human rights as the 
expression of moral self-determination, whereas “civic republicanism” 
tends to interpret popular sovereignty as the expression of ethical self-
realization (Habermas 1996: 99). Neither of these two responses, liberal 
and republican, “satisfies our normative intuition that human rights and 
popular sovereignty are not only interwoven, but of equal importance and 
even of the same origin: The two are, on a conceptual level, co-original” 
(Habermas 1994b: 2).
The principle of democracy is what then confers legitimating force on the le-
gislative process. The key idea is that the principle of democracy derives from 
the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form. I understand 
this interpenetration as a logical genesis of rights, which one can reconstruct in a 
stepwise fashion. One begins by applying the discourse principle to the general 
right to liberties – a right constitutive for the legal form as such – and ends by 
legally institutionalizing the conditions for a discursive exercise of political au-
tonomy. By means of this political autonomy, the private autonomy that was at 
first abstractly posited can retroactively assume an elaborated legal shape. Hence 
the principle of democracy can only appear as the heart of a system of rights. The 
logical genesis of these rights comprises a circular process in which the legal 
code, or legal form, and the mechanism for producing legitimate law – hence 
the democratic principle – are co-originally constituted. (Habermas 1996: 121)
Hence, democracy and rights, as the legitimizing and legislative power, 
constitute each other through private autonomy, which retroactively 
(reversely) takes legal shape and transforms legal forms into legal norms 
(i.e., rights). This is, concisely, Habermas’s dialectics of rights genesis. 
Habermas introduces three categories of rights in abstracto that 
define the private and public autonomy of persons who consider each 
other free and equal: a) basic rights that result from the politically au-
tonomous elaboration of the right to the greatest possible measure of equal 
individual liberties and two corollaries, b) basic rights that result from 
14 Some of these dichotomies and related theoretical issues were already discussed in 
sections 1 and 2. 
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the politically autonomous elaboration of the status of a member in a 
voluntary association of consociates under law, and c) basic rights that 
result immediately from the actionability of rights and the politically 
autonomous elaboration of individual legal protection. As Habermas 
explains, these three categories of rights result from the application of 
the discourse principle to the medium of law (i.e., “to the conditions for 
the legal form of a horizontal association of free and equal persons”). 
These rights should not be confused with Abwehrrechte – liberal rights 
against the state (negative personal rights) – because “they only regulate 
the relationships among freely associated citizens prior to any legally 
organized state authority from whose encroachments citizens would 
have to protect themselves” (Habermas 1996: 122).
The underpinning presuppositions of the cooriginality thesis are 
reflected in modern constitutions’ juxtaposition between the principle 
of popular sovereignty and the principle of individual (and collective) 
rights. The bearers of sovereignty are citizens of a polity, politically self-
understood as a nation or a collective constituted of individuals under-
stood as one entity – in other words, a body that exercises internal and 
external sovereignty. Since sovereignty is constantly transformed by the 
(power of the) state apparatus, the latter is in continuous need of legiti-
mation. Fundamental human and citizenship rights pose an additional 
safeguard against and check on this state power. On the symbolic level, 
but also in the sense of its legal origin and authority, the constitution 
embodies the cooriginality of human rights and popular sovereignty 
(i.e., private and public autonomy, negative and positive freedom, pas-
sive and active citizenship). That is where the normative robustness of 
constitutional patriotism stems from, as it binds exactly those political 
aporias that lie at the heart of contemporary citizenship. In my view, this 
is the most evident connection between Habermas’s legal, political, and 
social theory and the idea of constitutional patriotism. The cooriginality 
thesis explains why our patriotic allegiance, especially in the context of 
plural societies, should be with constitutions, as constitutions are loci of 
both one’s private autonomy and her rights and public autonomy of the 
political community she belongs to. Simply put, constitutions are sources 
of our legal and political identity, essential for overcoming the normative 
abyss between individual and community perspectives in contemporary 
liberal democratic polities. 
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4. Legitimacy: moral vs. legal norms
Legality and morality are often interpreted as incongruent notions. 
One could portray various theoretical discrepancies between the two in 
Western moral philosophy.15 The relation between two sources of ethi-
cal reasoning16 has been one of the dominant topics in contemporary 
political and legal theory triggered by the facticity of ethically plural 
societies. This question has penetrated contemporary citizenship theories 
in a post-Rawlsian era and became one of their fundamental issues. The 
importance of recognition of different moral worldviews and their vari-
ous forms is evident within both Habermas’s theory of law and his social 
theory, and, in my view, it relates firmly to the concept of constitutional 
patriotism. To address the issue of moral pluralism in his theoretical 
system of law, Habermas distinguishes morality and legality. He dif-
ferentiates moral norms – norms regulating interpersonal relationships 
and conflicts between natural persons who are supposed to recognize 
one another as both members of a concrete community and irreplace-
able individuals – from legal norms – norms regulating interpersonal 
relationships and conflicts between actors who recognize one another 
as consociates in an abstract community first produced by legal norms 
themselves (Habermas 1996: 112). 
Habermas’s argument in favor of reconciling these two axiological 
structures is simple. The contemporary states are territorially defined 
groups of individuals and communities organized through legitimately 
binding legal norms. To be legitimate, these norms should stem from 
discursive democratic practice and the law-making procedure, not from 
particular ethics. It is common knowledge that for most modern states 
(except for colonial states, occupied territories, and semi-sovereign ter-
ritories), the principal source of legitimacy is a constitution. Hence, if we 
follow his argumentation, the legality and legitimacy of basic constitu-
tional norms are those that ultimately matter, although morality often 
plays an unquestionable role in their formation.
15 See, for example, Hart (1962). One could also interpret this antinomy as the clash be-
tween “the good” and “a right”. Abraham Edel clarifies that these two concepts “conceptualize 
basic phenomena in human life”, the good interpreting humans as “goal-seeking beings who 
have desires and aspirations”, while rights determine them as beings who live “in groups that 
require some modes of organization and regulation involving practices, rules, and institutions” 
(Wiener 1974).
16 In Hegel’s (1991) philosophy, for example, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is a synthesis of 
abstract right and morality as self-determination (Moralität). Habermas himself, as explained 
in section 1, makes a clear distinction between ethical and moral. 
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Habermas defines the democratic principle of legitimacy in a way 
that “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the 
assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legisla-
tion that in turn has been legally constituted” (Habermas 1996: 110). 
Therefore, there must be a vantage point from which the norms can be 
impartially justified, a principle that reflects those symmetrical rela-
tions of recognition built into communicatively structured forms of life 
in general. The introduction of such a discourse principle presupposes 
that practical questions have already been arbitrated impartially and 
decided upon reasonably.
Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses. […] The predicate “valid” (gültig) 
pertains to action norms and all the general normative propositions that express 
the meaning of such norms; it expresses normative validity in a nonspecific sense 
that is still indifferent to the distinction between morality and legitimacy! I 
understand “action norms” as temporally, socially, and substantively generalized 
behavioural expectations. I include among “those affected” (or involved) anyone 
whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice 
regulated by the norms at issue. Finally, “rational discourse” should include any 
attempt to reach an understanding over problematic validity claims insofar as 
this takes place under conditions of communication that enable the free pro-
cessing of topics and contributions, information and reasons in the public space 
constituted by illocutionary obligations. (Habermas 1996: 107)
How does the validity of norms relate to constitutional patriotism? 
How does it narrow the scope of valid norms in a culturally, socially, and 
politically diversified society? The Janus-faced nature of a norm (validity 
and actionability) implies two distinct normative meanings. What is a 
prudent way to overcome opposite (conflicting) moral norms in con-
temporary plural societies and transform them into valid legal norms? 
Habermas’s answer is to refer to norms that have unquestionable demo-
cratic legitimacy (i.e., those derived from popular sovereignty). However, 
rights and liberties indispensable for exercising this sovereignty must not 
be jeopardized, and the transformation of ethical into political is not a 
straightforward process. Constitutional patriotism presumes that only a 
certain minimum of political principles and norms, shared by all political 
subjects, should establish the constitutional core of a polity. At the same 
time, it protects minorities from the domination of majoritarian moral 
norms by guaranteeing a minimal basic principle of mutual recognition. 
For some authors, constitutional patriotism is “a consciously shared 
sentiment arising from an ethical assessment of their country by the 
country’s people, according to which the country credibly pursues a 
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certain regulative political ideal for which the constitution stands” (Mi-
chelman 2001: 253). However, only norms to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree upon in a rational discourse can be considered le-
gitimate. Given the high ethical diversity of modern plural societies, one 
can reasonably argue for a minimalist rather than a maximalist prospect 
vis-à-vis the normative content of that constitution. In other words, 
legitimacy remains the primary domain of polity that constitutional 
patriotism tries to address. Constitutional patriotism as a normative 
concept in the works of Sternberger and Habermas arises as a solution 
for the crisis of legitimacy: in Sternberger’s case in post-war Germany 
and in Habermas’s case in contemporary plural societies. As Laborde 
(2002: 591) puts it, “constitutional patriotism is an influential attempt to 
reconcile the conflicting imperatives of political legitimacy and cultural 
inclusiveness.”
Instead of a consensus on values, Habermas believed that complex 
modern societies must look for “a consensus on the procedure for the le-
gitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power” (Haber-
mas 1994a: 135). Instead of looking for a common good (substance), they 
should instead decide how norms become rights (procedure). In this 
way, proceduralism and, indirectly, constitutionalism shape the norma-
tive core of Habermas’s legal theory, creating a normative dimension in 
which constitutional patriotism can be embedded. Legitimacy can be 
attributed only to those norms that stem from the social pact: a constitu-
tion and the legal order it creates. Therefore, particular ethics shared by 
members of groups that possess social and political power (majoritarian 
groups) could be adopted universally (constitutionally) only if they pass 
the above-mentioned legitimacy test. As Ingram (1996: 2) explains, “[a] 
post-national identity has to accommodate difference and plurality… 
Unity and legitimacy come from the constitution and the formal tie 
that holds people together is their continuing voluntary recognition of 
the constitution, their constitutional patriotism.” Legitimacy is the main 
argument in favor of the normative power of constitutional patriotism 
and its practical applicability in contemporary plural democracies.
Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper was to show that, although Haber-
mas did not fully elaborate it as a freestanding theory, constitutional 
patriotism is logically and normatively embedded in his social, political, 
and legal philosophy. For Habermas, post-metaphysical reason caused 
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the change in the foundations of normative reasoning, consequently 
entrenching certain domains of morality in the realm of intersubjec-
tive relations. In addition, positive law faces a duality expressed in what 
Habermas denotes as “facts” and “norms”: the sociological understanding 
of law as rules imposed by the state (facticity) and normative understand-
ing or internal legitimation of legal norms (validity). Therefore, to be 
legitimate, norms cannot simply be imposed on citizens but need to be 
reasonable and likely to be internally legitimized by them. These bind-
ing legal norms should stem from discursive democratic practice, the 
law-making procedure, not from any particular conception of the good 
life. Intersubjective creation of moral norms depends on the social and 
political structures in which these norms are (re)produced. Particularly 
in plural societies, where diverse ethical outlooks often collide, social 
mechanisms must exist that enable free deliberation and the creation of 
legal norms. That is why constitutional patriotism, as a form of allegiance 
and social integration, gives priority to the most universal, general, and 
thus non-biased norms, which are fundamental for every legal system. 
Constitutions as social pacts of modern states that result from political 
deliberation and form the ground for political and legal functioning of 
the community define and contain these norms. 
The quintessence of Habermas’s political theory lies in an attempt to 
overcome the abyss in modern political thought between republicanism 
and liberalism and the implications of this dichotomy for modern societ-
ies. He reconciled these opposing worldviews in his cooriginality thesis. 
This thesis resolves the normative tension between democracy and human 
rights, explaining that rights as entitlements, and sovereignty as a capac-
ity to guarantee these rights and express political will, arise in the same 
hypothetical moment. In other words, they cooriginate and presuppose 
one another. As ultimate aims of allegiance for constitutional patriots, 
modern constitutions reunite sovereignty and rights, regardless of their 
dissimilar normative appeal. This paper aimed to establish the connection 
between constitutional patriotism and Habermas’s epistemology and 
social theory. Although Habermas did not offer a fully-fledged theory 
of constitutional patriotism, his theoretical universe offers convincing 
logical and normative argumentation in favor of this concept. All the 
above-mentioned theoretical fragments are coherent and compelling in 
normative framing of constitutional patriotism as a post-national and 
post-conventional political identification and allegiance to a polity’s legal 
and political fundamentals, and subsequently as a model of patriotic 
loyalty and social integration in plural liberal democratic societies. 
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